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NOTES
NOTHING IS INEVITABLE:
A REJECTION OF THE INEVITABLE
DISCLOSURE DOCTRINE UNDER
THE DEFEND TRADE SECRETS ACT
JACQUELINE R. MANCINI†
INTRODUCTION
Until June 2013, Manish Desai worked for Molon Motor and
Coil Corporation (“Molon”) as Head of Quality Control.1 In June
of that year, Desai left Molon to take a position with a competitor of
Molon, Nidec Motor Corporation (“Nidec”).2 Molon brought suit
against Nidec for trade secret misappropriation and alleged that
Desai copied confidential information onto a flash drive before his
departure.3 Based on these allegations, Molon argued not only that
Desai unlawfully disclosed its trade secrets but also that “Nidec
used and continues to use that information.”4 Molon brought suit
under the federal Defend Trade Secrets Act and the Illinois
Trade Secrets Act.5 The District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois allowed Molon’s claims against Nidec to proceed based
on the “inevitable disclosure doctrine.”6 Molon’s complaint made
no allegations that Nidec, rather than Desai, misappropriated
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1
Molon Motor & Coil Corp. v. Nidec Motor Corp., No. 16 C 03545, 2017 WL
1954531, at *1 (N.D. Ill. May 11, 2017).
2
Id. at *2.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id. at *1.
6
Id. at *7.
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Molon’s trade secrets.7 Nonetheless, the court concluded that the
competition between the parties and the “similarity” of Desai’s
employment at Nidec were “enough to trigger the circumstantial
inference that the trade secrets inevitably would be disclosed by
Desai to Nidec.”8
The court’s analysis in Molon is only one example of the
application of the inevitable disclosure doctrine. The inevitable
disclosure doctrine permits a “plaintiff [to] prove a claim of trade
secret misappropriation by demonstrating that [a] defendant’s
new employment will inevitably lead him to rely on the plaintiff’s
trade secrets.”9 The doctrine is often used when an employee
stops working for the owner of a trade secret and begins working
for a competitor.10 However, application of the doctrine could inhibit employee mobility and free trade.11 Because an employer
could be held liable merely based on the decision to hire an employee, employees are discouraged from taking on a superior
position with a competing employer.12 This theory of liability
also increases the risks involved when a former employee, who
may have had access to trade secrets, starts a new company with
innovative ideas.13 For these reasons, the inevitable disclosure doctrine remains controversial, and not all courts have adopted it.14
In 2016, the Defend Trade Secrets Act (“DTSA”) created a
federal civil cause of action for trade secret misappropriation.15
In the few years since the DTSA’s passage, the fate of the inevitable disclosure doctrine remains unclear.16 Under the DTSA, one

7
Id. at *5 (“Molon ‘provides no specific allegations that would plausibly show that
Mr. Desai disclosed the alleged trade secrets to [Nidec] or that [Nidec] otherwise
obtained and used any information . . . .’ ”).
8
Id. at *7.
9
PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1269 (7th Cir. 1995).
10
See Molon Motor & Coil Corp., 2017 WL 1954531, at *7.
11
See Eleanore R. Godfrey, Inevitable Disclosure of Trade Secrets: Employee
Mobility v. Employer’s Rights, 3 J. HIGH TECH. L. 161, 178 (2004).
12
See id.
13
See Susan Street Whaley, Comment, The Inevitable Disaster of Inevitable
Disclosure, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 809, 844 (1999).
14
See Godfrey, supra note 11, at 173. Only eight states clearly apply the doctrine, six states apply a limited version, and the remainder either reject the doctrine
outright or lack explicit caselaw on the subject. See Brandy L. Treadway, Comment,
An Overview of Individual States’ Application of Inevitable Disclosure: Concrete
Doctrine or Equitable Tool?, 55 SMU L. REV. 621, 626–48 (2002) (providing an
overview of different states’ approaches to the doctrine).
15
See 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(1) (2018).
16
Brittany S. Bruns, Note, Criticism of the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016:
Failure to Preempt, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 469, 488 (2017) (“[W]hether the in-
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form of relief available is an injunction to prevent the disclosure
or use of the trade secret at issue.17 The statute indicates that
such injunctions may not place restrictions on employee mobility.18 This limitation, which prevents the injunctive relief provision from impacting employment, appears to disfavor the inevitable
disclosure theory of liability. However, as the Molon case demonstrates, the doctrine could still be used to prove the alleged
misappropriation of a trade secret.19 This ambiguity has led
some district courts to decline to apply the doctrine, some to
choose to apply the doctrine, and others to fail to reach the merits
of the issue.20
This Note argues that moving forward, federal courts should
reject the inevitable disclosure doctrine in cases arising under
the DTSA. Apart from the potential adverse effects on employment, application of the inevitable disclosure doctrine and the
rationales behind it are inconsistent with both the text of the
DTSA and its legislative history. This Note examines how the text
of the statute and its legislative history support this interpretation.
Part I of this Note discusses the history of the inevitable
disclosure doctrine and the passage of the DTSA. Before discussing the DTSA and the changes it made to trade secret law, it
is necessary to explain the origins and purpose of the inevitable
disclosure doctrine. The doctrine was developed by state courts
as an equitable remedy in instances where there was no direct
evidence that any disclosure of a trade secret had taken place.21
The DTSA, on the other hand, is designed to fill a gap in federal
law by creating a federal civil cause of action for trade secret
misappropriation.22 Thus, the DTSA ensured that the owners of

evitable disclosure doctrine may be used to prove misappropriation is an open
question.”).
17
18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(A).
18
Id.
19
See Molon Motor & Coil Corp. v. Nidec Motor Corp., No. 16-C-03545, 2017 WL
1954531, at *7 (N.D. Ill. May 11, 2017).
20
See, e.g., UCAR Tech. (USA) Inc. v. Li, No. 17-CV-01704, 2017 WL 6405620, at
*3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2017) (rejecting the doctrine); Oakwood Labs., LLC v. Thanoo,
No. 17-CV-05090, 2017 WL 5762393, at *4 (D.N.J. Nov. 28, 2017) (failing to reach
the inevitable disclosure question); Mickey’s Linen v. Fischer, No. 17 C 2154, 2017
WL 3970593, at *13 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 8, 2017) (applying the doctrine and granting an
injunction against defendant).
21
B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Wohlgemuth, 192 N.E.2d 99, 105 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963)
(“Equitable intervention is sanctioned when it appears, as it does in the instant case,
that there exists a present real threat of disclosure, even without actual disclosure.”).
22
162 CONG. REC. H2032 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 2016) (statement of Rep. Conyers).
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trade secrets would no longer be confined to state law remedies.23
Part I also explores how this federal statute intersects with the
inevitable disclosure doctrine.
Part II of this Note analyzes the DTSA, using traditional
tools of statutory interpretation. First, it argues that the text of
the DTSA does not support the application of the inevitable disclosure doctrine to cases brought under the federal statute.
Second, Part II argues that the legislative history of the DTSA
conflicts with an application of the inevitable disclosure doctrine
under the DTSA. In the debate and reports on the DTSA, members of Congress indicated that they understood trade secret
misappropriation to refer to deliberate theft of trade secrets, not
the eventual disclosure of information contemplated by the inevitable disclosure doctrine.24 Finally, Part II argues that while the
DTSA does not preempt the inevitable disclosure doctrine, application of the doctrine is inconsistent with both the text and
legislative history of the Act.
Part III of this Note argues that concerns over employment
and employment mobility strongly discourage the application of
the inevitable disclosure doctrine under the DTSA. The potential
impact of the application of the doctrine is particularly striking
considering that Congress sought to create a uniform federal
cause of action.25 The use of the inevitable disclosure doctrine
could lead to inconsistent, fragmented effects on employment in
different regions of the country.
I. BACKGROUND
A.

The Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine

Trade secret theft is a crime under state and federal law.26
Additionally, under both state trade secret laws and the DTSA,
the owner of a trade secret may bring a civil cause of action
against a person who misappropriates its trade secrets.27 In addition to seeking damages, the owner of a trade secret may also
seek injunctive relief to maintain the secrecy of the information

23

See Martin J. Salvucci, Note, A Federalist Account of the Law of Trade
Secrecy, 29 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 183, 191 (2018).
24
See 162 CONG. REC. S1634 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 2016) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
25
See S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 14–15 (2016).
26
See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.05 (West 2019); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1832
(2018).
27
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 8-27-4 (2019); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1836.
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and prevent the defendant’s continued use of the information.28
Where direct evidence of misappropriation is lacking, some states
apply the inevitable disclosure doctrine to authorize relief in a
given case.29
Specifically, the inevitable disclosure doctrine allows a plaintiff
to “prove a claim of trade secret misappropriation by demonstrating that [the] defendant’s new employment will inevitably
lead him to rely on the plaintiff’s trade secrets.”30 The doctrine is
typically applied in instances where a plaintiff cannot produce
direct evidence of misappropriation.31 New York courts were the
first to articulate the doctrine, arguing that one could rely on the
circumstantial inference that the plaintiff’s former employee
would eventually disclose the plaintiff’s trade secrets by virtue of
the new employment relationship.32 In other early cases, state
courts found that leaving a company to work for a competitor was
a breach of the employer’s confidence and trust, and determined
that such behavior should be enjoined.33 The doctrine was used
to give the owner of a trade secret recourse even when evidence
of direct misappropriation was unavailable.34
In 1995, the Seventh Circuit considered PepsiCo, Inc. v.
Redmond, a seminal case that confirmed that the inevitable disclosure doctrine could be a “legitimate basis” for injunctive relief
to prevent the disclosure of a trade secret.35 The plaintiff, PepsiCo,
had asserted that the defendant, Redmond, could not help but
rely on PepsiCo’s trade secrets in the course of his new employment.36 Although the court conceded that PepsiCo had “not
brought a traditional trade secret case,” the court found that
28

UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985).
JAMES POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS § 7.02(2)(b)(ii) (2013) (“Nevertheless, circumstances may be such that the likelihood of disclosure or misuse by a competitor
appears overwhelming to the court.”).
30
PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1269 (7th Cir. 1995).
31
William Lynch Schaller et al., Trade Secret “Triggers”: What Facts Warrant
Litigation?, 19 SEDONA CONF. J. 625, 636 (2018).
32
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Powers Film Prods., Inc., 189 A.D. 556, 561 (4th Dep’t
1919) (“The mere rendition of the service along the lines of his training would almost
necessarily impart such knowledge to some degree.”).
33
B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Wohlgemuth, 192 N.E.2d 99, 105 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963).
34
See id. The first court to describe disclosure as occurring “inevitably” in this
context was the Delaware Court of Chancery. See E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v.
Am. Potash & Chem. Corp., 200 A.2d 428, 435 (Del. Ch. 1964) (“Plaintiff says that on
this record an issue is created as to whether disclosure will inevitably or probably
follow from Hirsch’s employment by Potash . . . .” (emphasis added)).
35
Godfrey, supra note 11, at 170.
36
PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1269 (7th Cir. 1995).
29
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disclosure of PepsiCo’s information was inevitable “unless Redmond
possessed an uncanny ability to compartmentalize information.”37
Despite the fact that there were no allegations of trade secret
theft, the Court granted an injunction because Redmond’s inevitable use of confidential information would harm PepsiCo’s
interests.38 The court compared PepsiCo to “a coach, one of
whose players has left, playbook in hand, to join the opposing
team before the big game.”39 Following PepsiCo, use of the doctrine increased in many jurisdictions, in part due to the growth of
information technology and the ease with which such information
could be stolen.40
However, not all states recognize the inevitable disclosure
doctrine as a lawful remedy within trade secret law.41 While the
Uniform Trade Secrets Act permits an injunction of either
“[a]ctual or threatened” misappropriation of protected material,42
not all courts have interpreted the word “threatened” to authorize an injunction under an inevitable disclosure theory.43 Due to
its potential impacts on employee mobility, the doctrine has
remained controversial44 and has been adopted in a minority of
jurisdictions.45 Proponents of the doctrine argue that disclosure
or use of confidential information and trade secrets is unavoidable if a former employee begins working for a competitor in the
same industry.46
Although there is no universal definition of the elements of
the inevitable disclosure doctrine,47 most courts require that:
(1) “trade secrets exists,” (2) “the employee had access to them,”
and (3) the secrets will “inevitably be used.”48 In applying PepsiCo,
courts have articulated a variety of factors to determine when

37

Id. at 1269–70.
See id. at 1270.
39
Id.
40
Godfrey, supra note 11, at 173.
41
See id.
42
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985).
43
Gregory Porter & Joseph Beauchamp, The Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine and
Its Effect on Employee Mobility, HOUS. LAW., Nov.-Dec. 2006, at 36, 38.
44
See Godfrey, supra note 11, at 173.
45
Only eight states have explicitly adopted the inevitable disclosure doctrine.
See Treadway, supra note 14, at 626–32.
46
See Godfrey, supra note 11, at 166.
47
Id. at 174.
48
See Porter & Beauchamp, supra note 43, at 37.
38
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disclosure of a trade secret is “inevitable.”49 These factors involve
“the level of competition between the [plaintiff] and the new
employer,” the similarity between the employee’s former position
and their new position, and whether the circumstances indicate
the new employee will not safeguard the plaintiff’s trade secrets.50
B. State Trade Secret Law Since the Passage of the DTSA
1.

The Lack of Uniformity in State Trade Secret Law

The law governing trade secrets originated in state common
law.51 Each state developed its own law of trade secrecy, leading
to an inherent “lack of uniformity” that “became increasingly
problematic” when interstate commerce increased in the early
twentieth century.52 In 1939, section 757 of the First Restatement of Torts consolidated the common law of trade secrets
across the various states.53 In 1979, the Uniform Law Commission sponsored the creation of the Uniform Trade Secret Act,
which follows the approach of the First Restatement.54 “Within
ten years of the UTSA’s publication,” over thirty states adopted
the model statute in its entirety or in a modified form.55 As of
2013, when Texas adopted the UTSA, only three states remain
that have not adopted the statute: New York, North Carolina,
and Massachusetts.56
Under the UTSA, misappropriation of a trade secret involves
the “acquisition, unauthorized disclosure, or unauthorized use of a
trade secret” that was acquired through “improper means, either
by a defendant or by a person from whom the defendant derived
knowledge of a trade secret.”57 The UTSA defines “[i]mproper

49
See, e.g., Nucor Corp. v. Bell, No. 06-CV-02972, 2008 WL 9894350, at *18
(D.S.C. Mar. 14, 2008) (identifying six factors for the conclusion that disclosure is inevitable); RKI, Inc. v. Grimes, 177 F. Supp. 2d 859, 876 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (identifying
three factors).
50
Nucor Corp., 2008 WL 9894350, at *18; RKI, Inc., 177 F. Supp. 2d at 876.
51
Robert Denicola, The Restatements, the Uniform Act and the Status of
American Trade Secret Law, in THE LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 18, 18 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Katherine J.
Strandburg eds., 2011).
52
See id. at 19.
53
Richard F. Dole, Jr., The Uniform Trade Secrets Act—Trends and Prospects,
33 HAMLINE L. REV. 409, 410 & n.4 (2010).
54
See Salvucci, supra note 23, at 186–87.
55
Id. at 187.
56
Id. at 187 & n.34.
57
Dole, supra note 53, at 425.
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means” as “theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage
through electronic or other means.”58 Trade secrets are defined
as “information” that “derives independent economic value” from
not being generally known and that is subject to “efforts that are
reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.”59
However, despite the adoption of the UTSA, states vary in
what is required for a plaintiff to prove a claim of trade secret
misappropriation.60 Varying by state, the prima facie case has
between two and six elements.61 For example, in Ohio, to establish a claim for trade secret misappropriation, a plaintiff must
prove that (1) “a trade secret exists,” (2) the “secret was acquired
[via] a confidential relationship,” and (3) the trade secret was
used without authorization.62 By contrast, the elements of the
claim in Oregon are “(1) a valuable commercial design, (2) a confidential relationship between the party asserting trade secret
protection and the party who disclosed the information[,] and
(3) the key features of the design that were the creative product
of the party asserting protection.”63 In Wisconsin, the elements
differ once again; courts in that state require that (1) the defendant acted improperly, (2) “the information was substantially
secret,” (3) “reasonable efforts were made to keep [the information]
secret,” and (4) “the defendant knew or should have known that
its action was improper.”64
2.

The DTSA Creates a Federal Cause of Action

The first federal foray into trade secret law was the Economic Espionage Act (“EEA”) of 1996, which criminalized the
theft of a trade secret on behalf of a foreign government or for
“monetary gain.”65 The EEA also prohibited attempted theft of
trade secrets and conspiracy to steal trade secrets.66 Throughout

58

UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(1) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985).
Id. § 1(4).
60
See David S. Almeling et al., A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret Litigation
in State Courts, 46 GONZ. L. REV. 57, 91 (2010–2011).
61
Id.
62
Penetone Corp. v. Palchem, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 997, 1005 (N.D. Ohio 1985).
63
Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. McCain Foods, Ltd., 941 F.2d 970, 972 (9th Cir. 1991).
64
RTE Corp. v. Coatings, Inc., 267 N.W.2d 226, 231 (Wis. 1978).
65
David S. Levine & Christopher B. Seaman, The DTSA at One: An Empirical
Study of the First Year of Litigation Under the Defend Trade Secrets Act, 53 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 105, 114 (2018); Salvucci, supra note 23, at 188.
66
Salvucci, supra note 23, at 188.
59
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the 1990s and 2000s, various trade groups lobbied Congress for
the creation of a civil cause of action under the EEA due to the
lack of uniformity at the state level.67 “In February 2013, a
White House–sponsored task force” reported that the pace of
trade secret theft was “accelerating” around the country.68 In
2010, trade secret litigation was “on the rise” at the state level,
and a majority of states, the District of Columbia, and the Virgin
Islands had “adopted trade secret statutes in the [prior] three
decades.”69
The DTSA was a bipartisan effort authored by Republican
Senator Orrin Hatch and Democratic Senator Chris Coons.70 The
bill was designed to bring “uniformity to trade secret litigation so
creators and owners of trade secrets can more effectively address
the growing problem of trade secret theft.”71 The drafters sought
to eliminate the procedural hurdles faced by the owners of trade
secrets when navigating the patchwork of state trade secret laws
by creating a federal remedy.72 Trade secrets become less valuable once they are disclosed or used without authorization;
Congress sought to create a speedy remedy for companies to use
to protect their trade secrets.73 The bill ultimately passed the
Senate eighty-seven votes to zero and passed the House 410 votes
to two.74 President Obama signed the DTSA into law on May 11,
2016.75
The DTSA amended the EEA to establish a federal civil
cause of action for trade secret misappropriation.76 Previously,
18 U.S.C. § 1836 had only authorized the Attorney General to
bring a civil action to obtain injunctive relief where there was a
violation of the criminal statute.77 To bring a cause of action

67

See id. at 188–89.
Id. at 190.
69
See Almeling et al., supra note 60, at 93.
70
162 CONG. REC. S1635 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 2016) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
71
Id.
72
162 CONG. REC. H2032 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 2016) (statement of Rep. Conyers).
73
Id.
74
Vicki Needham, President Obama Signs Trade Secrets Bill, THE HILL (May
11, 2016, 6:06 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/finance/trade/279608-president-obamasigns-trade-secrets-bill [https://perma.cc/5Y54-F7BS].
75
Linda K. Stevens, President Obama Signs Defend Trade Secrets Act, ABA:
PRACTICE POINTS (May 13, 2016), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/
committees/intellectual-property/practice/2016/president-obama-signs-defend-tradesecrets-act/ [https://perma.cc/L7QJ-NKML].
76
S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 3 (2016).
77
18 U.S.C. § 1836(a) (2012), amended by 18 U.S.C. § 1836 (2018).
68
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under the DTSA, an owner of a trade secret may bring a civil
claim, provided the secret is “related to a product or service used
in . . . interstate or foreign commerce.”78 A plaintiff may seek a
civil seizure order, injunctive relief, or monetary damages.79 The
introduction of the civil cause of action gave trade secrets the
similar level of federal protection as copyrights, patents, and
trademarks.80
The civil seizure provision of the DTSA permits the owner of
a trade secret to make an ex parte application to seize property
necessary to prevent the disclosure or dissemination of the trade
secret at issue in the case.81 Notably, the statute indicates that
the ex parte seizure provision should be invoked only in “extraordinary circumstances.”82 Congress also placed a limitation on
the scope of injunctive relief under the DTSA; the injunctions
may not “prevent a person from entering into an employment
relationship” or “otherwise conflict with an applicable State law
prohibiting restraints on the practice of a lawful profession,
trade, or business.”83 When seeking monetary damages, a
plaintiff can recover for any “actual loss” stemming from misappropriation or “unjust enrichment.”84 A detailed analysis of the
DTSA’s provisions follows in Part II.
3.

The Fate of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine Under the
DTSA Thus Far

Since the passage of the DTSA, a number of district courts
have directly confronted the application of the inevitable disclosure doctrine in cases brought under the federal statute. District
courts have taken a variety of different approaches to arguments
made under an inevitable disclosure theory; some have explicitly
recognized the doctrine and applied it to cases brought under the
DTSA.85 Other courts have explicitly rejected the doctrine’s ap-

78

18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(1) (2018).
Id. § 1836(b)(1)–(3).
80
See Levine & Seaman, supra note 65, at 107.
81
18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(2).
82
Id.
83
Id. § 1836(b)(3).
84
Id. § 1836(b)(3)(B).
85
See, e.g., Jazz Pharm., Inc. v. Synchrony Group, LLC, 343 F. Supp. 3d 434,
445–46 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (construing the DTSA’s “threatened misappropriation” to include inevitable disclosure); PrimeSource Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. Huttig Bldg. Prods.,
Inc., Nos. 16 CV 11390, 16 CV 11468, 2017 WL 7795125, at *17 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 9,
2017); Mickey’s Linen v. Fischer, No. 17 C 2154, 2017 WL 3970593, at *12 (N.D. Ill.
79
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plication to federal trade secret misappropriation claims.86 Still
others have failed to take a clear stance on the issue.87
For example, the Northern District of Illinois applied the
doctrine in Mickey’s Linen v. Fischer.88 The plaintiff alleged that
the defendant, a former employee, took a new position with the
plaintiff’s main competitor.89 Despite a lack of direct evidence of
trade secret theft or misappropriation, the court concluded that
there was reason to believe that the defendant would inevitably
use the plaintiff’s trade secrets and granted the plaintiff’s injunction on that basis.90
By contrast, the District Court for the Northern District of
California explicitly rejected the doctrine in UCAR Tech. (USA),
Inc. v. Li.91 The defendants argued that the plaintiff’s DTSA claim
was based on the inevitable disclosure theory, which courts in California have failed to adopt.92 However, the court found that
several of the plaintiff’s trade secret misappropriation claims fell
within the definition of the DTSA and did not need the inevitable
disclosure doctrine.93 California had previously rejected the doctrine under its own trade secret statute in Whyte v. Schlage Lock
Co.94
Notably, other states have failed to take a definitive stance
on the issue of the doctrine’s application. For example, in Free
Country Ltd. v. Drennan, the District Court for the Southern
District of New York noted that a plaintiff could “theoretically
Sept. 8, 2017); Panera, LLC. v. Nettles, No. 16-CV-1181, 2016 WL 4124114, at *4
(E.D. Mo. Aug. 3, 2016).
86
See, e.g., UCAR Tech. (USA) Inc. v. Li, No. 17-CV-01704, 2017 WL 6405620, at
*3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2017).
87
See, e.g., Oakwood Labs., LLC v. Thanoo, No. 17-CV-05090, 2017 WL 5762393,
at *4 (D.N.J. Nov. 28, 2017) (finding that the plaintiff did not allege the trade secrets
at issue with sufficient specificity); Xoran Holdings LLC v. Luick, No. 16-13703,
2017 WL 4039178, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 13, 2017) (holding plaintiff made sufficient allegations to support a misappropriation claim independent of an inevitable
disclosure theory); Chubb INA Holdings Inc. v. Chang, No. 16-2354, 2017 WL 499682,
at *9 (D.N.J. Feb. 7, 2017) (holding that plaintiff alleged actual use of a trade secret,
rather than inevitable disclosure); Free Country Ltd. v. Drennan, 235 F. Supp. 3d
559, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (noting that a plaintiff could “theoretically lodge an inevitable disclosure claim,” but had not done so here).
88
2017 WL 3970593, at *13.
89
Id. at *12.
90
Id. at *13.
91
2017 WL 6405620, at *3.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 277, 293 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (“[O]ur rejection of the inevitable disclosure doctrine is complete.”).
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lodge an inevitable disclosure claim based on the information”
that the employee had access to.95 However, the court concluded
that it was not physically possible for the employee to retain the
information in a form that would be useful to the plaintiff’s
competitor.96
II. THE TEXT AND THE HISTORY OF THE DEFEND
TRADE SECRETS ACT DO NOT SUPPORT THEAPPLICATION
OF THE INEVITABLE DISCLOSURE DOCTRINE
This Note argues that both the statutory text and the legislative history of the DTSA are in direct opposition to the views
of courts that have opted to apply the inevitable disclosure
doctrine under the Act. Some commentators and scholars have
argued that the DTSA fails to effectively preempt the inevitable
disclosure doctrine.97 Such scholars suggest that the DTSA should
be amended to explicitly preempt the doctrine.98 However, this
Note argues that amendment of the DTSA is unnecessary because the text and legislative history of the Act are sufficient to
preclude the application of the inevitable disclosure doctrine.
Courts applying the doctrine are failing to read the statute as a
whole and are disregarding its legislative history in favor of their
own states’ views of the inevitable disclosure doctrine. Furthermore, amendment of the DTSA, while perhaps wise, would be
impractical given the current climate of gridlock in Congress.99
A.

The Text of the DTSA

A close examination of the statutory language within the
DTSA suggests that the inevitable disclosure doctrine should not
be applied to prove misappropriation of a trade secret in cases
brought under the statute. The language of 18 U.S.C. § 1836,
which establishes the civil cause of action, and section 1839,
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which defines key terms in the statute, conflict with the use of
the inevitable disclosure doctrine to establish circumstantial evidence of misappropriation in a number of ways. First, the statute’s definition of “misappropriation” requires knowledge that the
trade secret was “acquired by improper means,” an element that
is absent from the inevitable disclosure doctrine analysis.100
Second, the statute’s definition of “improper means” is also inconsistent with an application of the inevitable disclosure doctrine
because the doctrine does not require a finding of theft, bribery,
or espionage on the part of a former employee.101 Third, the strict
requirements of the ex parte seizure provision reflect an intention not to place restraints on employment.102 Finally, the DTSA’s
injunction remedy authorized under the statute specifically prohibits injunctions that would prevent a person from taking on
certain employment.103
1.

The Definition of Misappropriation

The DTSA added section 1836 to Title 18 of the United
States Code. That section authorizes the “owner of a trade secret
that is misappropriated [to] bring a civil action under this subsection if the trade secret is related to a product or service used
in, or intended for use in, interstate or foreign commerce.”104 The
DTSA defines “misappropriation” as follows:
(A) acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who
knows or has reason to know that the trade secret was
acquired by improper means; or
(B) disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express or implied consent by a person who—
(i) used improper means to acquire knowledge of the trade
secret;
(ii) at the time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to
know that the knowledge of the trade secret was—
(I) derived from or through a person who had used improper means to acquire the trade secret;
(II) acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty
to maintain the secrecy of the trade secret or limit
the use of the trade secret; or

100
101
102
103
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See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(5) (2018).
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(III) derived from or through a person who owed a duty
to the person seeking relief to maintain the secrecy
of the trade secret or limit the use of the trade
secret; or
(iii) before a material change of the position of the person,
knew or had reason to know that—
(I) the trade secret was a trade secret; and
(II) knowledge of the trade secret had been acquired by
accident or mistake.105

This definition enumerates a number of potential types of trade
secret misappropriation that are actionable under the statute.106
In order to fully demonstrate the inapplicability of the inevitable
disclosure doctrine, it is necessary to consider each part of the
definition in turn.
Under 18 U.S.C. § 1839(5)(A), misappropriation is defined as
“acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who knows or
has reason to know that the trade secret was acquired by improper means.”107 This definition requires the defendant to have
knowledge of how the trade secret was acquired. But the inevitable disclosure doctrine does not require an inquiry into what
the defendant actually knows or definitive proof that the defendant acquired the trade secret.108 Courts have found it sufficient
that a plaintiff’s former employee went to work for a “serious
competitor” and would be taking on a similar position with his
new employer.109 Moreover, plaintiffs have not been required to
prove that defendants or new employers knew, nor should have
known, that the former employees had retained any knowledge of
the plaintiffs’ trade secrets.110
Under section 1839(5)(B)(i), misappropriation includes “disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express or
implied consent by a person who . . . used improper means to
acquire knowledge of the trade secret.”111 By its plain terms, this
provision requires use of improper means. But under an inevita-
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ble disclosure theory, a defendant-competitor could be held liable
merely for the decision to hire a former employer of a competitor
for a similar position.112 Even if the defendant used or disclosed
trade secret information inadvertently, the decision to hire a new
employee is inconsistent with a common sense understanding of
the phrase “improper means.” Black’s Law Dictionary has defined “improper conduct” as “behaviour that a reasonable and
sensible person would not do.”113 The American Heritage Dictionary defines “improper” as “[n]ot in keeping with conventional
mores; indecorous . . . ,” and it defines “means” as “[a] method, a
course of action, or an instrument by which an act can be
accomplished or an end achieved.”114 The decision to hire a
certain employee is not unreasonable behavior that a “sensible
person would not do” nor an “indecorous” course of action. Hiring
an employee with expertise valuable to one’s company, even one
who worked for a competitor, is relatively commonplace. Furthermore, the statute itself gives the term “improper means” a
specific definition.115 The doctrine rests on the assertion that a
former employee “cannot help but rely on [a plaintiff’s] trade
secrets.”116
The third definition of misappropriation contemplated by
section 1839(5)(B) is the “disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express or implied consent by a person who . . . at
the time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to know that
the knowledge of the trade secret was” derived through a person
who used improper means to acquire it or had a duty to maintain
the secrecy of the information.117 This subsection appears to
reject the idea that a defendant-corporation could be held liable
absent knowledge of the source of the trade secret. Under the inevitable disclosure doctrine, the plaintiff does not have to allege
any knowledge on the part of the defendant-competitor.118 In ad-
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dition, the plaintiff need not allege that the defendant actually
disclosed or used any trade secret information.
Finally, section 1839(5)(B) provides that misappropriation
includes “disclosure or use of a trade secret . . . by a person
who . . . knew or had reason to know that . . . the trade secret was
a trade secret[,] and . . . knowledge of the trade secret had been
acquired by accident or mistake.”119 As noted above, the inevitable disclosure doctrine does not require an inquiry into what the
defendant-competitor corporation actually knows.120 Nor need a
plaintiff allege any actual use or disclosure of the trade secret on
behalf of the defendant.121 As a result, the definitions of misappropriation under the DTSA are in direct conflict with the requirements of misappropriation under the inevitable disclosure
theory.
2.

The Definition of Improper Means

A proper understanding of the DTSA’s definition of misappropriation relies heavily on the statue’s definition of “improper
means.” Section 1839(6) indicates that improper means “include[ ]
theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a
breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage through
electronic or other means,” and “does not include reverse
engineering, independent derivation, or any other lawful means
of acquisition.”122 Under this definition, the inevitable disclosure
doctrine does not require improper means. Courts that apply the
inevitable disclosure doctrine look at factors including the level of
competition between the competitors, the similarity of the former
employee’s new position to his or her old position, and the trustworthiness of the new employee not to reveal the plaintiff’s trade
secrets.123 This analysis does not involve a determination that
the defendant engaged in any of the “improper means” enumerated by the DTSA. One could argue that the inevitable disclosure theory could rely on the “breach . . . of a duty to maintain
secrecy” language of section 1839(6).124 However, the inevitable
disclosure doctrine does not require a breach of a duty to
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maintain secrecy because the former employee need not actually
disclose the trade secret. A plaintiff need only allege that the conditions of employment make it likely that the employee will
disclose the information.125
3.

The Requirements Under the Ex Parte Seizure Provision

One remedy authorized by the DTSA is an ex parte seizure
procedure.126 Upon an ex parte application, the court may “issue
an order providing for the seizure of property necessary to
prevent the propagation or dissemination of the trade secret that
is the subject of the action.”127 Although this remedy was designed to be used “only in extraordinary circumstances,” the specific requirements for an order to be issued suggest a rejection of
the inevitable disclosure doctrine.128 For example, to obtain an
order for the seizure of property, a plaintiff must show that the
defendant actually misappropriated the trade secret.129 In other
words, the ex parte order cannot be based on the mere possibility
of misappropriation. Under the inevitable disclosure doctrine, a
court may grant relief based on circumstantial evidence that the
former employee will eventually disclose or use the trade secret
at his new job.130 Under the DTSA, the plaintiff must show that
the defendant actually possesses the trade secret in order to
obtain an ex parte order.131 The statute also notes that the seizure should “be conducted in a manner that minimizes any
interruption of the business operations of third parties.”132 In the
context of an inevitable disclosure theory, the business operation
of third parties could include the decision of a competitor to hire
a former employee of the owner of a trade secret. However, the
DTSA requirements suggest that Congress sought to authorize
the most severe punishment for a specific type of trade misappropriation—the deliberate theft of trade secrets for use or
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disclosure by a competitor.133 Although the requirements for an
injunction or a claim for damages are more lenient, the strict requirements for an ex parte order suggest that Congress did not
intend to restrain legitimate business activity and impact
employment.
4.

Limitations Within the Injunctive Relief Provision

Apart from monetary damages or an ex parte seizure order,
the DTSA authorizes a third remedy—injunctive relief.134 The
injunction may be granted “to prevent any actual or threatened
misappropriation” of a trade secret.135 However, section 1836(b)(3)
contains two restrictions on the court’s discretion to craft an
injunction. The injunction may not “prevent a person from entering into an employment relationship” or “otherwise conflict with an
applicable State law prohibiting restraints on the practice of a lawful profession, trade, or business.”136 Under section 1836(b)(3)(A)(i)(I),
any conditions on employment within an injunction must “be
based on evidence of threatened misappropriation and not merely
on the information the person knows.”137 Although these limitations do not apply to an action to recover damages for trade secret
misappropriation, a complete reading of the statute suggests that
the DTSA was not meant to adversely impact the ability of employees to take on a similar position with a competitor.
B. The Legislative History of the DTSA
In addition, the legislative history and statements of
members of Congress regarding the DTSA contradict the use of
the inevitable disclosure doctrine in cases brought under the
statute in at least three important ways. First, statements from
members of Congress relating to their understanding of the concept of trade secret misappropriation suggest that the inevitable
disclosure doctrine is inconsistent with their intent. These statements demonstrate that trade secret misappropriation was meant
to refer to theft and economic espionage. Second, Congress
enacted the DTSA to create a new remedy for the theft of trade
secrets and sought to balance the goals of the statute with the
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rights and needs of third parties.138 Third, shortly before the
bill’s passage, Congress amended the statute to limit the injunctive relief provision to prohibit injunctions that place a limit on
employment.139 This amendment suggests that Congress sought
to protect the rights of employees in enacting the DTSA.
1.

Deliberate Theft and Economic Espionage

Congress’s understanding of trade secret misappropriation is
inconsistent with the application of the inevitable disclosure
doctrine to DTSA claims. Generally, the statements of members
of Congress during the debate and passage of a statute can be
used to reinforce its apparent meaning. The language of the
statements by many Congress members during debate on the bill
indicates that they intended the DTSA to combat deliberate theft
of trade secrets and economic espionage. By contrast, the goal of
the inevitable disclosure doctrine is to combat the potential disclosure of trade secret information by former employees to their
new employers.140
Throughout the debate on the statute, lawmakers made
statements that indicated the DTSA was designed to prevent and
punish deliberate theft of trade secrets and confidential information. In 2015, the Senate Judiciary Committee conducted a hearing entitled “Protecting Trade Secrets: The Impact of Trade
Secret Theft on American Competitiveness and Potential Solutions
to Remedy This Harm.”141 In its later report on the DTSA, the
Senate Judiciary Committee cited statistics on the theft of trade
secret information in support of the need for the bill.142
Specifically, the committee noted that “annual losses to the
American economy caused by trade secret theft are over $300
billion” and “trade secret theft has led to the loss of 2.1 million
American jobs each year.”143 The final draft of the bill included
section 4, which requires the Attorney General to prepare a report on “the scope and breadth of trade secret theft from United
States companies” and “the threat posed by trade secret theft
occurring outside of the United States.”144
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During floor debate, DTSA co-author Senator Orrin Hatch
explained that the bill was meant to address “the need to recover
a stolen trade secret.”145 During the House debate, Representatives Collins, Nadler, Jeffries, and Lee used the phrases “trade
secrets theft” and “trade secret theft” when discussing the
conduct the DTSA was designed to combat.146 Representative
Collins, a co-sponsor of the bill, stated that the DTSA “allows
victims of trade secrets theft to obtain a seizure.”147 Representative Nadler, another co-sponsor, praised the bill for helping to
combat trade secret theft at a time when “it has never been
easier to transfer stolen property across the globe with the click
of a button” just by using today’s technology.148
Speaking on the purpose of the bill, Representative
Goodlatte explained that the statute was “creating a Federal civil
remedy for trade secrets misappropriation that will help American innovators protect their intellectual property from criminal
theft by foreign agents and those engaging in economic
espionage.”149 Under the inevitable disclosure doctrine framework, an employee or competing company can be held liable
based on its decision to enter a new employment relationship.150
Employment decisions are far from similar to “criminal theft” or
“economic espionage.” Choosing to hire a particular employee
does not involve any specific intention to steal information from a
competitor. The confidential information the employee may have
acquired was also not taken intentionally. Furthermore, the inevitable disclosure doctrine was not developed to combat intentional
theft, but rather was developed to combat the eventual disclosure
of information by a former employee.151
2.

The Balanced Goal of the DTSA

Apart from a desire to combat the deliberate theft of trade
secrets, Congress also intended to balance the effort to protect
trade secrets with the rights of defendants and legitimate
businesses. Much of the debate and discussion of the DTSA on
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the floor of Congress endorses the view that the statute was
meant to be a balanced measure that would consider the legitimate business interests involved in trade secrets claims. For
example, the Senate Judiciary Committee report indicates that
“it is important when seizing information to balance the need to
prevent or remedy misappropriation with the need to avoid
interrupting the legitimate interests” of defendants or third
parties.152 The committee concluded that the DTSA is “narrowly
drawn legislation” and is “designed to avoid disruption of legitimate business . . . .”153 The House Judiciary Committee report
explained that “the legislation is designed to avoid disruption of
legitimate businesses” and is “[c]arefully balanced to ensure an
effective and efficient remedy for trade secret owners.”154 During
floor debate in the House, Representative Nadler noted that the
DTSA “carefully balances the rights of defendants and the needs
of American businesses to protect their most valuable assets.”155
Similarly, while discussing the ex parte seizure provision,
Senator Hatch stated that “[t]he provision is tailored to prevent
abuse—balancing the need to recover a stolen trade secret with
the rights of defendants and third parties.”156 He emphasized that
“third parties would not be harmed if an order were granted,”
and the drafters “also included damages for wrongful seizure . . . .”157 The House Judiciary Committee report, commenting on the same provision, noted that any seizure ordered under
the DTSA should “minimize any interruption to the business
operations of third parties” while also “protect[ing] the seized
property from disclosure.”158 The House report also emphasized
the balanced nature of the statute and noted that “the legislation
is designed to avoid disruption of legitimate businesses.”159 The
desire to balance the mission of the DTSA with the needs of
legitimate businesses conflicts with the application and goals of
the inevitable disclosure doctrine. The doctrine was designed to
combat potential disclosures of information based on the movement of employees.160 The imposition of liability in such circum152
153
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stances could have an impact on hiring decisions.161 This impact
on employment decisions could result in a “disruption of legitimate
businesses” that the drafters of the DTSA were trying to avoid.162
3.

Amendment to Injunctive Relief Provision

Congress enacted the DTSA to combat the increasing problem of trade secret theft around the country.163 The injunctive
relief provision, as noted above, was intended to provide an additional remedy for trade secret misappropriation. However, certain
members of Congress, including Senator Dianne Feinstein of
California, expressed “concern that the injunctive relief authorized under the bill could override state-law limitations that
safeguard employee mobility.”164 In response to these concerns,
the bill was amended to prohibit injunctions that “prevent a
person from entering into an employment relationship.”165 In its
report on the DTSA, the Senate Judiciary Committee noted that
the amended version of the injunctive relief provision “reinforces
the importance of employment mobility.”166 Given Congress’s
serious concerns regarding trade secret theft, its decision to
amend the statute to limit the injunctive provision indicates that
members of Congress placed a high value on continued employee
mobility. The inevitable disclosure theory is used most often in
the context of a former employee choosing to work for a
competitor.167 The importance Congress has placed on employee
mobility supports a rejection of this theory of liability—at least in
the way some district courts have applied the inevitable
disclosure doctrine.
C. Amendment to the DTSA is Unnecessary and Impractical
Given the statutory text outlined above, as well as the
DTSA’s legislative history, amendment of the DTSA is both unnecessary and impractical. Some commentators have suggested
that amendment of the Act is necessary to expressly preempt the
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inevitable disclosure doctrine.168 Such authors cite to the federal
courts that have applied the doctrine in the period following the
passage of the DTSA to support this view.169 However, such concerns about preemption and amendment are unwarranted for
several reasons.
For one, a complete reading of the statute, noting the
provisions outlined above, provides ample support for the view
that the inevitable disclosure doctrine is inapplicable under the
DTSA. The text of the DTSA, through the definitions of misappropriation and improper means, the strict requirements for ex
parte seizures, and the amendments to the injunctive relief
provision, indicate that the inevitable disclosure doctrine is
incompatible with the DTSA.170 Additionally, courts that apply
the doctrine to claims under the DTSA typically fail to consider
whether the passage of the DTSA impacts the applicability of the
doctrine. When applying the doctrine, such courts instead refer
to their own state’s law or pre-DTSA case law.171 As a result,
these courts are improperly ignoring the text and legislative
history of the DTSA. If federal courts employed the tenets of
statutory interpretation advocated by this Note, a potential
amendment to the statute would become unnecessary.
Furthermore, Congress is unlikely to rise to the task of
amending the DTSA in light of the current political climate. As
of the 2018 midterm elections, the House is controlled by a
Democratic majority, while Republicans hold the Senate and the
presidency.172 Such periods of divided government are often the
least productive for Congress.173 At the moment, Congress appears unable—or unwilling—to address even the most urgent
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issues facing the country today.174 Scholars have argued that
increased polarization, “relative parity” between support for the
two major parties, and divided government have all contributed
to “gridlock and policy stalemate” in Congress.175 As a result,
even attempting to amend the DTSA would be impractical.
Instead, the courts should adopt a reading of the DTSA that
encompasses the entire statute and gives proper deference to the
legislative history and purpose of the Act.
III. THE POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF THE
INEVITABLE DISCLOSURE DOCTRINE ON EMPLOYMENT
The inevitable disclosure doctrine should not be used as a
means of proving trade secret misappropriation, because neither
the text nor the legislative history of the Defend Trade Secrets
Act supports its application. This interpretation of the statute
and its history will also alleviate concerns that the DTSA will
negatively impact employee mobility and industry innovation. In
November 2015, a group of law professors submitted a letter to
Congress indicating their opposition to the DTSA.176 They argued that the language of the injunctive relief provision,
although appearing to reject the doctrine, implicitly recognizes
the inevitable disclosure doctrine.177 The professors proceeded to
argue that federal recognition of the doctrine could have serious
impacts on employment, as well as economic growth and innovation.178 This argument reflects the concerns of other commentators
regarding the employment impacts of the inevitable disclosure
doctrine.179
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Application of the inevitable disclosure doctrine has the potential to place serious constraints on individual employee
mobility. Jurisdictions that reject the doctrine argue that the
doctrine “ ‘creates a de facto covenant not to compete’ and ‘run[s]
counter to the strong public policy . . . favoring employee mobility.’ ”180 In states that apply the doctrine, the threat of liability
under an inevitable disclosure theory can restrict employees’
decisions to leave their current employers for better positions at
competing employers.181 The possibility that they could be held
liable for trade secret misappropriation—if courts are likely to
find that they will inevitably disclose trade secrets based on
circumstantial probability—may discourage employees from
taking jobs with competitors.182 The inevitable disclosure doctrine infringes on the fundamental employment law principle of
at-will employment and undermines employees’ ability to move
from job to job freely.183
The inevitable disclosure doctrine can also impact innovation
and the legitimate interests of businesses. For example, competing employers may be unwilling to hire a former employee of
their competitor if they might be held liable for trade secret
misappropriation.184 Smaller companies that compete with larger
companies may be unable to hire experienced employees if they
were previously employed by a competitor.185 As a result, these
companies will be limited in their access to the best professionals
within a given field. In addition, the threat of liability under an
inevitable disclosure theory could stifle the creation of new companies by former employees of owners of trade secrets.186 Without
employee mobility and the creation of new business ventures,
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economic growth would stagnate.187 In this way, the inevitable
disclosure doctrine runs counter to the main goal of the DTSA—to
prevent the economic loss created by the theft of trade secrets.188
CONCLUSION
The Defend Trade Secrets Act is a powerful new tool for
owners of trade secrets that have had their valuable confidential
information stolen or misappropriated. The federal civil remedy
provides a streamlined process for the adjudication of these
claims. The previous patchwork of state law regimes was challenging to navigate. However, Congress did not intend to allow
for use of the inevitable disclosure doctrine under this new
scheme. The inevitable disclosure doctrine allows the owner of a
trade secret to prove a claim of misappropriation based on the
circumstances of a former employee’s new employment with a
competitor. The doctrine allows for a circumstantial inference of
misappropriation absent any evidence that the defendant
actually acquired, used, or disclosed the trade secret. This doctrine, although not adopted by all jurisdictions, plays a significant role in trade secret law around the country.
But increased application of the inevitable disclosure doctrine has the potential to limit employment opportunities.
Liability under an inevitable disclosure theory risks that an
employee could be held liable for the decision to take on a new job
with a competitor. Alternatively, an employer could be held
liable for the decision to hire a certain employee. This theory of
liability conflicts with an employee’s fundamental right to take
on new employment freely.
Nonetheless, both the text and the legislative history of the
DTSA lead to the conclusion that the inevitable disclosure
doctrine theory of liability should be rejected by courts interpreting the statute. The definition of misappropriation and improper
means, as well as the requirements under both the ex parte
seizure and injunctive relief provisions, demonstrate that the
DTSA is incompatible with the inevitable disclosure doctrine.
Furthermore, the legislative history reveals that Congress did
not intend to include the inevitable disclosure doctrine under the
DTSA. Rather, it intended to protect employee mobility and minimize disruption to the legitimate business of third parties.
187
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